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Abstract
In this paper we present a continuous time model with reversible abate-
ment capital in order to analyze the e¤ects of environmental policies on the
value of the rm and investment decisions. We show that the e¤ects depend
on what sort of future policy are implemented. We focus on investment ef-
fects of changes in corrective taxes to control the use of polluting inputs, and
subsidies to promote abatement investment. We show that (1) while taxes
have a depressive e¤ect on capital accumulation, subsidies boost investment;
(2) the impact of these policies on the value of the rm is ambiguous. This
latter result has important empirical implications insofar as investment are
based on the average value of the rm rather than the (unobservable) mar-
ginal value.
Key words: Pollution uncertainty; externality; capital reversibility; en-
vironmental policy.
JEL classication codes: E22, L51, H23, Q28.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the e¤ect of environmental policies on the abatement invest-
ment decisions of a competitive rm, facing pollution uncertainty. The relationship
between economic decisions and pollution dynamics has been extensively studied
over the last decade (Bretschger and Smulders, 2007; Egli and Steger 2007; Soretz,
2007). The standard problem concerns the optimal timing of a discrete policy
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that a society or a government should adopt to reduce emissions of environmen-
tal pollutant. Some common features characterize this class of models. Smulders
and Gradus (1996), and Soretz (2007) model pollution as an externality which af-
fects the productivity of inputs and/or utility of consumption. Fisher (2000) and
Pindyck (2000) remark that irreversibility is a feature that frequently comes into
play together with pollution, shaping the optimal abatement investment strategies.
Pindyck (2000) emphasizes that abatement investment and pollution have to do
with the e¤ects of uncertainty, and that when irreversibility and uncertainty come
together, delaying policy adoption may be optimal for an investor.
These models captured a growing attention and many theorists investigated the
consequences of environmental policies on abatement investment strategies using
the real option value approach (Fisher, 2000; Pindyck, 2002; Lin et al., 2007;
Ansar and Spark, 2009; Lin and Huang, 2010).
More recently, Lin and Huang (2011), and Saltari and Travaglini (2011) (here-
after LH and ST) extended the basic model of option value, shifting the attention
from the net social benets of a policy, to the net private benets of a rm invest-
ing in clean capital goods. As they argue, an e¢ cient energy-saving or abatement
investment programme need to take account of the trajectory of costs and prots
over time associated to the project, rather than just at a single point in time. Both
these papers are related to the literature on optimal stopping time, but they start
from di¤erent assumptions and reach di¤erent results.
Specically, LH study the entry and exit strategy in energy industry, using an
option value approach which allows to manage the exibility of environmental real
assets (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). They combine the concept of Tobins q the
viewpoint of rm value and the concept of real option to determine the optimal
stopping time of adopting a new energy-saving project. In their setup, the rm has
the monopoly right to invest in a single, discrete project, and future discounted
prots and costs are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. As they
show, the greater uncertainty makes waiting more valuable relative to investing at
once, reducing the present value of the active greenrm relative to the one of
the idle.
However, ST argue that in many situations investments are made sequentially
by the rm choosing the time path of its capital stock. Therefore, they sustain, it
must be specied in more detail how abatement investment decisions are a¤ected
by adjustment costs of investment, and how alternative environmental policies im-
pinge upon the optimal investment strategy chosen by the green rm. Following
this idea, ST examine the e¤ects of environmental policies aimed at stimulat-
ing private investment in pollution abatement capital. In their framework, rm
operates in a competitive market, capital is irreversible, and pollution follows a
geometric Brownian motion. Basically, aggregate pollution is seen as an exter-
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nality which a¤ects the investment decisions of any single rm. They show that,
with irreversibility and uncertainty, environmental policies promoted to enforce
abatement capital may generate the unexpected result of reducing the rm value
and the abatement investment rate. Interestingly, ST underline that their results
generalize LHs results because their model not only provides the optimal stopping
time of the investment strategy, as it is in LH, but also how much to invest in a
new abatement project at each instant of time.
The model developed herein is a version of the ST model. The original intuition
of the investment model is in Saltari and Travaglini (2003 and 2006) and Travaglini
(2008). We study the e¤ects of environmental policies under the assumption of
pollution uncertainty but reversible capital. The questions at the heart of the
present paper are: is the blend between irreversibility and uncertainty a necessary
condition to determine the counterintuitive e¤ects of environmental policies on
investment decisions of a rm? Are taxes and subsidies equivalent instruments to
stimulate abatement investments?
To scrutinize these questions, we investigate the properties of an investment
model where aggregate pollution is an externality which a¤ects negatively the
productivity of inputs. We assume however that abatement investment is reversible
with an adjustment cost of investing given by a quadratic convex function. In
this setup, incentive-based policy instruments work by altering incentives for rm
investment decisions. We focus on taxes on the level of particular inputs (such
as oil), and subsidies on abatement capital. We get two main results. First, we
show that corrective taxes on the polluting input will reduce investment while
subsidies will stimulate them. Second, environmental policies can have a positive
or negative impact on the value of the rm, depending on the magnitudes of
parameters a¤ecting the operating prot and the rents accruing to the rm.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we introduce
the pollution process and the Bellman equation for the value of the rm. We then
relate the abatement investment to the form of the investment cost function. Next
we study the e¤ects of environmental policies on both the value of the rm and
the optimal abatement investment decision. The last section concludes.
2 The model
Let pt be a variable that represents the stock of aggregate pollution, say the con-
centration of CO2 in the atmosphere. The ow of pollution pt evolves according
to the geometric Brownian motion:
dpt
pt
= (v   ')dt+ dzt (1)
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where v is the instantaneous drift,  is the instantaneous standard deviation,
and dz is the increment to a Wiener process with mean of zero and standard
deviation of
p
dt: Note that in equation (1) pollution growth is reduced by a
factor ' which measures the environmental benets associated to the aggregate
abatement investments. In other words, the advantage in adding new units of
abatement capital is given by the growth rate ' which quanties the slowdown of
pollution growth induced by the abatement activities of the whole economy: It is
helpful to rewrite equation (1) as
dpt
pt
= dt+ dzt (2)
where   v   ' is the net instantaneous growth rate of pollution.
The rm undertakes gross abatement investment At and incurs depreciation at
a constant rate  > 0: Thus, the change in the abatement capital stock Mt is:
dMt = (At   Mt) dt (3)
and in steady state At=Mt = :
Pollution enters as a negative externality in the production function of any
single rm, decreasing the productivity of inputs (Smulders and Gradus, 1996;
Bretschger and Smulders, 2007). Conceptually, we treat aggregate pollution as a
negative technical change. The production function has the Cobb-Douglas form:
Yt = U

t

p t Mt
1 
(4)
where  is the income share of the polluting input and satises the inequality
0 <  < 1: The Cobb-Douglas specication is, perhaps, restrictive (due to the
unit elasticity of substitution), but it is adopted here for its analytical tractability
(Bretschger and Smulders, 2007; Mulder and Degroot, 2007; Shadbegiana and
Gray, 2005).
The rm produces at each instant of time an output Yt usingMt units of abate-
ment capital and Ut units of polluting input. Because of the pollution externality,
the e¤ective units of capital are reduced by a factor pt ; so that in e¢ ciency units
capital isMt=p

t : In this formulation  is a measure of the strength of the e¤ects of
aggregate pollution on abatement capital: the higher is ; the lower is the capital
in e¤ective units (Smulders and Gradus, 1996). Equation (4) can be rewritten as
Yt = p
 
t
 
Ut M
1 
t

(5)
with  = (1   ) to emphasize that pollution is a global externality a¤ecting
negatively the level of output.
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The rm pays a xed unit cost ! to use the polluting input Ut and an exoge-
nously environmental tax rate  to employ the input, so that total cost of Ut is
(! + )Ut. The tax  internalizes the externality by inducing the rm to behave
as if pollution costs enter its private cost function. In addition, tax  alters the
payo¤s that rm faces because the operating prot at time t equals instantaneous
revenue minus total cost,
t = p
 
t
 
Ut M
1 
t
  (! + )Ut
The rm chooses Ut to maximize the instantaneous operating prot t. It is easily
shown that
max
Ut
p t
 
Ut M
1 
t
  (! + )Ut = hptMt (6)
where h = (1  )   
!+
 
1  > 0 and  =   < 0: Note that hpt is the marginal
revenue of abatement capital at time t; and the pollution e¤ect on operating prot
is negative:
2.1 The value of the rm
The value of the rm is
V (Mt; pt) = max
As
E
Z 1
t

hpsMs   c (As) + As

e rsds (7)
where r > 0 is the (assumed) constant interest rate. In equation (7) the cost for
increasing the stock of abatement capital byAs is c (As) As; where c (As) denotes
the cost of investing at the rate As; and 0    1 is a subsidy potentially given by
the government to cover some of the expenses for expanding the abatement capital
by As. Note that taxes and subsidies are di¤erent in their e¤ects on prots. A
rm gains an additional income from an abatement subsidy  only when it decides
to invest; whereas, a tax  results in a loss to the rms since it pays tax on all
polluting inputs employed in production. As we will see, in detail, below, the
asymmetric e¤ect on prot of taxes and subsidies will shape the rms investment
abatement decisions, and the impact of a specic environmental policy.
The value of the rm satises the following Bellman equation
rV (M; p) dt = max
A
 
hpM   c (A) + A dt+ E (dV ) (8)
(we suppress time subscripts unless they are needed for clarity). Applying Itos
lemma to E (dV ) to get the expected change in the value of the rm and putting
VM  q we get the expression
rV (M; p)= max
A

hpM   c (A)+A+(A  M) q + V pp+
1
2
2Vppp
2

(9)
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This expression can be simplied by maximizing outthe rate of investment to
obtain:
rV (M; p)= hpM +    Mq + Vpp+ 1
2
2Vppp
2 (10)
where
  max
A
[Aq + A  c (A)] (11)
In expression (11)  is the value of the rents obtained from undertaking investment
at the rate A:When the green rm invests, it acquires Adt units of capital, whose
value is (qA+ A) dt; but it pays c(A)dt to increase the abatement capital. Hence,
Aq + A   c (A) is the net value the rm gains per unit of time to invest at the
rate A:
2.2 Investment, rents and the value of rm
Let us explore equation (11) a little further. We assume that abatement capital
is reversible. We use a specialized version of the framework of Abel and Eberly
(1997), under the assumption of reversible abatement capital stock. The case of
irreversibility is studied in ST (2011).
We here assume that the cost of investing at time t is given by the following
convex function:
c(At) = bAt +

2
A2t (12)
where bAt is the xed cost for purchasing abatement capital at the rate At; and

2
A2t is a quadratic cost of adjustment. Using (12), equation (11) becomes
  max
A
h
Aq   (b  )A  
2
A2
i
(13)
Because the investment cost function is convex, the rm earns rents on inframar-
ginal units of investment when investment is non zero, that is, when q 6= b  that
is when q+ 6= b:Reversible investment when q > b  and q0 < b : The convex
curve (b  )At+ 2A2t represents the net cost function. It is strictly convex, passes
through the origin, and has a slope equal to b  at the origin. When q > b  the
marginal value of capital is greater than the net cost of capital, so qA is steeper
than (b  )At + 2A2t at the origin. In this case, q exceeds the net cost for some
positive values of A > 0, and the optimal value of investment A is the value that
maximizes Aq  (b  )A  
2
A2. The rents  ; for positive value of the investment;
are the vertical distance between the straight line and the curve at A.
Note, however, that when q
0
< b    the straight line representing q0A is less
steep than (b  )At+ 2A2t ; at the origin. In this case, q0A exceeds (b  )At+ 2A2t
for some negative values of investment. In this scenario, the optimal value of
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investment A0 is negative, and the value of the rents  is again shown as the
vertical distance between q
0
A and (b  )At + 2A2t at A
0
. Since the optimal gross
investment can be negative or positive when the cost function is given by equation
(12), we consider this case as one in which abatement investment is reversible.
To sum up, the optimal investment solution takes the form
A =
1

[q   (b  )] (14)
and the optimal rents are given by the expression
  = [q   (b  )]2 1
2
(15)
Equations (10) and (15) together generate a non-linear second order partial di¤er-
ential equation. But we imposed enough structure on our intertemporal problem
to obtain an explicit solution. The solutions below satisfy equations (10) and (15)
V (M; p) = q(p)M +G (p) (16)
where
q(p) =
hp
r +       
2
(   1)2  Bp
 (17)
and
G (p)=
1
2
  
Bp
2
r   2    (2   1)2   2
Bp (b  )
r      
2
(   1)2 +
(b  )2
r
!
(18)
where B = h
r+   
2
( 1)2 : Further, recall that G(p) = 0 when q = b   n; since
at this point the slope of the adjustment cost function is equal to the marginal q,
and the rents are equal to zero by denition.
Several results follow immediately from these conditions. First, we observe that
the value of the rm is a linear function of the abatement capital stock M , since
the slope of q is independent ofM: For a competitive rm with constant returns to
scale of production, the marginal operating prot depends only on the direct cost
(! + ) of the polluting input, and, thus, it is independent on the capital stockM:
Second, the rents G(p) and the value V (M; p) depend on both q and ; given the
interest rate r and the other parameters. Finally, investment A is an increasing
function of q: But q depends on pollution p and taxes  , whereas it is not a¤ected
by subsidies .
Obviously, these features a¤ect the value of the rm when the environmental
policy changes. This focal matter is examined in the next section.
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3 Environmental policy
In this section we address two policy issues: rst, we investigate if, in the model
described above, taxes and subsidies are equivalent instruments to stimulate abate-
ment investments; second, we wonder, what are the e¤ects of those policies on the
value of the rm?
To see what are the e¤ects of an increase in tax on investment, recall that
investment depends positively on q: Thus, it is straightforward to realize that
an increase in  reduces investment. In fact, taxes directly a¤ects the cost of
the polluting input U: We know that the marginal revenue of capital is hp with
h = (1  )   
w+
 
1  > 0: Hence:
dh
d
< 0 (19)
Expression (19) says that as  increases h decreases, and, therefore, so does hp.
Hence, an increase of  reduces the marginal q value of the rm and thus invest-
ment. Notice that this is a distorsive e¤ect. The aim was to reduce pollution but
the result is a reduction in abatement investment.
Let us now scrutinize the e¤ect of a tax  increase on the value of the rm.
While the e¤ects on q are clear, the same cannot be said for the rents. The change
in  also alters the present value of rents but in an indenite direction since
@G (p)
@h
@h
@
Q 0 (20)
This is because the the sign of the rst derivative is indeterminate:
@G (p)
@h
=
p

 
r +       
2
(   1)2 (21) 
q
r   2    (2   1)2  
b  
r      
2
(   1)2
!
From our model, it is evident that rents  are positive both when q < b    and
when q > b ; and equal to zero when q = b : Recall, however, that the present
value of rents G(p) depends directly on tax : Hence,  has a non linear pattern:
it is positive but decreasing until q = b   where it becomes equal to zero, and it
is positive and rising afterwards. This nonlinearity shapes the function G(p) and
its relation with : This in turn means that a tax increase may reduce or increase
the value of the rm.
Let us now focus on the subsidy . An increase in subsidy directly impacts on
investment by decreasing the cost of purchasing capital goods. Di¤erently from
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a tax increase on the polluting input, a subsidy increase stimulates investment in
abatement capital by directly reducing its purchasing cost.
To see the e¤ects on the value of the rm, we have to look at the rents created
by the adjustment costs. In fact, the incentive deriving from a subsidy increase di-
rectly a¤ects the present value of rents G(p) without a¤ecting the q value. Looking
at the e¤ect of a change in subsidy, we get:
@G (p)
@
=
1

 
q
r     
2
(   1)2  
b  
r
!
R 0 (22)
As in the case of a tax increase, the e¤ect of an increase in subsidy on the value of
the rm is indeterminate. At rst sight, this result may appear counterintuitive.
The ambiguity of the relationship depends on two features: rstly, subsidies di-
rectly a¤ect the cost of the investment rate; secondly, the adjustment cost function
is convex, and this non linearity a¤ects the optimal investment decision.
4 Conclusion
Lin and Huang (2011) demonstrated that the theory of Tobins q and real options
can be usefully employed to evaluate the feasibility of investing in energy-saving
equipment. Saltari and Travaglini (2011) emphasized that, with irreversible capital
and pollution uncertainty, the value of a rm captures the option value of the costly
technology for disinvesting. Both these papers provide a new exible thinking for
decision making criteria in environmental issues. Nonetheless, these papers do not
provide an analysis of the e¤ect of environmental policies when abatement capital
is reversible.
Here, we presented a continuous time model with reversible abatement capital
in which the e¤ect of environmental policies on the value of the rm and invest-
ments depends on what sort of policies are implemented, focusing in particular on
investment e¤ects of changes in corrective taxes, to control the use of polluting
inputs, and subsidies, to promote abatement investment. We have shown that
taxes and subsidies have opposite e¤ects on investment and that the impact of
these policies on the value of the rm is ambiguous.
In our framework, pollution is an externality which a¤ects negatively the pro-
ductivity of the rm. Abatement investment is a¤ected by pollution and quadratic
adjustment costs. Both, pollution and adjustment costs inuence the impact of
policies aimed at promoting abatement investment. Specically, an increase in tax
rate reduces the marginal revenue of capital, inducing a lower investment rate for
any given pollution level. Therefore, if corrective taxes have the indirect e¤ect of
reducing the after-tax return of private capital, the rm can nd optimal to lower
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investment rather than raise it. Conversely, subsidies will stimulate abatement
investment.
Nonetheless, the e¤ect of these policies on the value of the rm is indeterminate.
The main reason is that when taxes or subsidies change the (present value of)
rents change in a non-monotonic way because of the form of adjustment cost
function. Thus, environmental policies have an ambiguous e¤ect on the value of
the rm, depending on the magnitudes of parameters a¤ecting the operating prot
and the rents. For the same reasons, even an increase of pollution uncertainty
has ambiguous e¤ects on the value of the rm. This ambiguity has important
empirical implications since it implies the average q^ value of the rm changes in
an unpredictable way.
This has important implications for the relationship among marginal q and
average q^ value of the rm and the rate of investment. At each instant of time
the rm chooses the rate of investment. In theory, as we saw above, investment
depends on the marginal value of the rm, q. But the average value of the rm q^,
namely the ratio of the market value of the existing capital to its replacement cost
q^ =
V (p)
(b  )M =
qM +G(p)
(b  )M
is the only operational index that the rm can observe and use during investment
process. Comparing average q^ with marginal q; we notice that the change in q^; in
response of a change in either taxes or subsidy; is ambiguous, while that of marginal
q is determinate. Thus, since environmental policies have ambiguous e¤ects on
G(p); they will have indenite e¤ects on q^; as well. Thus, as far as investment
decisions are based on the average value of the rm rather than its marginal value,
the e¤ects of changes in taxes or subsidies on investment is unpredictable:
Finally, three main suggestions for economic policy can be gathered from our
analysis. First, when the policy maker denes an emissions abatement objective,
subsidies should be preferred to corrective taxes. Some project of interest such
as the introduction of a carbon tax can, indeed, have some long-term unexpected
consequences on pollution dynamics, as it is in the case presented in our paper. A
carbon tax is an environmental tax that is levied on the carbon content of fossil
fuels. From an economic perspective, it is a type of Pigovian tax. But if a carbon
tax reduces the q value of the rm, then this kind of pollution charge will have
the distorsive e¤ect of reducing the spending in abatement investment. Over time,
this phenomenon will contribute to rise pollution rather than to reduce it. Second,
as we noted earlier, the rm observes only the average q^ value. Obviously, in this
context even for a regulator (government) there may be di¢ culties in identify-
ing economically e¢ cient targets. As we have shown, average q^ value is a¤ected
by both taxes and subsidies, and it also depends on the adjustment cost func-
tion. Finally, our model states that further market imperfections and alternative
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shocks can alter the relationship among irreversibility, defensive capital, pollution
emission and protability of investment (Calcagnini et al. 2009; Travaglini, 2011,
2012).
Therefore, the di¢ culties in designing environmental packages to defend en-
vironment and welfare are immense. However, a reasonable conclusion might be
that, at least in our setup, environmental instruments such as subsidies will have
superior long-run properties to control pollution emission, enhancing the quality
of environment and welfare. Therefore, the present framework does deliver scenar-
ios that appear to be innovative when environmental and economic consideration
suggest signicant nonlinearities in behavior.
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